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Abstract
“Pay for performance,” a reimbursement method under
which some physicians and hospitals are paid more than oth-
ers for the same services because they have been deemed to
deliver better quality care and their patients appear to have
better outcomes, is enormously controversial. Disputes
invariably arise over how “quality” should (or even can) be
measured. Nevertheless, differentiating between medical
providers, financially, lies at the heart of this new reim-
bursement innovation developed by insurance companies
and employers. Its two main objectives are: (1) to increase
the overall quality of health care that patients receive, and
(2) to encourage behavioral change on the part of physicians
and hospitals that leads to increased efficiency. This article
attempts to explain where the momentum for “pay for per-
formance” reimbursement has come from, why its advo-
cates consider it an improvement upon existing payment
systems, and how it can both positively and negatively
affect medical providers.
The majority of health care spending in the U.S., argues
health economist David Cutler, is good. Rather than pay
less, he maintains that we as a nation should pay for more
medical care, albeit wisely.1 Unfortunately, getting addi-
tional value from increased medical spending is difficult
under the current models of reimbursement. The three worst
payment mechanisms for rewarding quality and perfor-
mance, jokes health economist Jamie Robinson, are: (a)
fee-for-service, (b) capitation, and (c) salary.2 What all three
of these models have in common is that, financially, they
generally treat most physicians and hospitals the same
regardless of their patients’ outcomes.3 “Pay for perfor-
mance,” then, is principally an effort by a growing number
of employers and insurers to find new ways to pay medical
providers that increases the value and quality of the health
care that they purchase, as well as the efficiency with which
it is provided.4 Two landmark reports by the Institute of
Medicine [IOM]—To Err is Human (2000) and Crossing
the Quality Chasm (2001)—put health care quality and
patient safety issues squarely on the public policy agenda.5
The 2000 report estimated that as many as 98,000 patients
die annually in U.S. hospitals due to preventable medical
errors. The statistic was made more visceral when the
report’s authors noted that this was equivalent to a 300-pas-
senger airplane crashing almost daily in the U.S.6
The IOM reports raised the profile of an initiative closely
related to “pay for performance” reimbursement, which
goes far beyond just improving hospital safety. It is critical
for medical providers to understand what this initiative is
and how accumulating evidence over the last three decades
have shaped its development. The initiative is to reduce
unwarranted geographic variation in both the volume and
variety of medical care provided, while at the same time
increasing the kinds of care that clearly work and improve
patients’ health.7
Economic & Epidemiological
Origins
Key to understanding why efforts to reduce unwarranted
medical variation and “pay for performance” reimburse-
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ment are closely inter-connected is to recognize that there is
no one single American health care system. There are,
instead, hundreds of regional health care systems across the
country; and each one has its own unique approache to
patient care and medical spending. Where you live has a sig-
nificant effect on which (and how many) physicians you see,
how many days you spend in the hospital (if any), and what
drugs you are (or are not) prescribed.8 The realization of this
fact, like so many other discoveries in the field of medicine,
had a serendipitous quality to it. In rural Vermont in the
early 1970s, a Dartmouth phy-
sician by the name of John
Wennberg discovered a medi-
cal peculiarity. In a very
homogenous part of the coun-
try, doctors in two nearby towns
with similar characteristics
appeared to have adopted
wildly different practice styles.
In one town, 70 percent of the
children had had their tonsils
removed by age 12; in the other,
the figure was only 20 percent.9
Intrigued, Wennberg and many
of his colleagues at Dartmouth
and elsewhere have spent the
better part of the last three
decades documenting similarly dramatic geographic varia-
tions in far more serious cases: mastectomies, coro-
nary-bypass surgeries, and radical prostatectomies, to name
a few.10 Other “small-area large-variation” studies have
found that the number of cesarean sections is often much
higher in low birth-rate counties than in high birth-rate
counties, even after controlling for a variety of factors (such
as differences in local prices or rates of illness) that could
explain this disparity.11 Medicare administrators have dis-
covered that the program pays twice as much per patient in
Miami as it does in Minneapolis, yet the Miami patients do
not live longer than the Minneapolis patients, nor are they
healthier.12
Researchers and insurers have deduced two things from
these and other similar findings. First, physician practice
styles are often influenced nearly as much by local fac-
tors—such as collaboration, referral and the number of com-
petitors—as they are by what medical treatments have been
scientifically validated (“evidence-based”).13 And, second,
when it comes to medicine, supply generally creates its own
demand, which runs counter to the ordinary competitive
forces in our economy.14 In short, the substantial differences
in health care spending that exist across the country are dis-
proportionately related to the number of specialists, hospital
beds and technology available.15
While most physicians exemplify the professional and altru-
istic virtues that the general public both expects and deeply
admires, they are also humans who respond rationally to
existing financial incentives.16 Moreover, they usually have
significant medical education debt, at least early in their
careers, and/or sizeable practice
expenses that they must
finance.17 Therefore, if an area
of the country has many spe-
cialists, patients tend to see
them more often.18 If hospitals
in an area have a surplus of
beds, more patients invariably
tend to spend more time in
them.19 There are so many
Medicare patients in New York
City and parts of Florida, for
example, that doctors (particu-
larly specialists) have always
had a strong incentive to locate
there.20 Once established in
these types of locations, they
would be going against their
own self-interest if they did not try to keep themselves busy.
Essentially, supply creates its own demand, because physi-
cians are rational economic agents and—given the structure
of current healthcare financing—they ordinarily act ratio-
nally to maximize their revenue.21 And ensuring that
patients receive properly integrated and managed care with
an abundance of proven preventative care is ordinarily not
lucrative for medical providers in terms of their reimburse-
ment from private or public payers (health insurers,
Medicare, Medicaid).22
In an effort to improve patient outcomes, “pay for perfor-
mance” schemes often try to increase the amount of high
quality preventative care.23 Ten to twenty years ago, there
was no widely agreed-upon methodology for measuring the
quality of health care.24 It used to be assumed that differ-
ences among hospitals or doctors in a particular specialty
were generally insignificant.25 If one plotted a graph show-
ing the patient outcomes of all the centers that treated diabe-
tes or heart disease—or most any other condition for that
matter—people expected that the curve would look some-
thing like a shark fin, with most places clustered around the
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In short, the substantial differences
in health care spending that
exist across the country are
disproportionately related to
the number of specialists,
hospital beds and technology
available.
very best patient outcomes.26 But mounting evidence has
begun to indicate otherwise. What one tends to find instead
is a bell curve: a number of medical providers with shock-
ingly poor outcomes for their patients, a roughly equal num-
ber on the other side of the curve with extraordinarily good
results, and a large “average” middle.27
The growing ability to measure patients’ outcomes, and the
subsequent discovery that they vary more than previously
assumed, has contributed to the popularity of “pay for per-
formance” reimbursement
because it would allow health
plans and employers to do three
things simultaneously: (a) pay
more to medical providers with
the best patient outcomes, (b)
encourage the majority of medi-
cal providers with average out-
comes to find ways of
improving, and (c) pay less to
medical providers with the
worst patient outcomes—or
perhaps not pay them at all. If
publishing K-12 educational
test scores and “on-time
arrival” statistics is considered
a good idea for encouraging
local schools and airlines to
improve their performance, the argument goes, how bad of
an idea could it be for medical providers?
Policy and Legal Implications
“Pay for performance” could be problematic for a couple of
reasons, observers contend, particularly for small physician
practices and hospitals.28 First, it could encourage gaming
on the part of hospitals and physicians, whereby they con-
sciously or unconsciously favor taking healthier, more edu-
cated and affluent patients with the highest probability of
successful outcomes.29 Under this “rich get richer, while the
poor get poorer” scenario, “pay for performance” might
unfairly penalize physicians who care for sicker and less
affluent patients.30 Donald Berwick, founder of the Institute
for Healthcare Improvement and one of the leading voices
for raising standards of medical quality, supports perform-
ance-based models for hospitals and health systems, but he
is skeptical of their value at the individual physician-level.31
Second, many older patients have multiple chronic condi-
tions with different clinical practice guidelines [CPGs],
which complicates assigning them to any one “pay for per-
formance” quality or outcome-based measure.32
Fortunately for hospitals, physicians, and practice manag-
ers, existing “pay for performance” models tend to only pay
more for the best providers: all those either above a specific
threshold or percentile ranking in terms of their patients’
care and outcomes.33 They currently do not single out any
specific minority of providers for lower payment. Further-
more, physicians and hospitals that already meet a standard
(e.g., an 80 percent childhood
immunization rate or a 100 per-
cent administration of aspirin to
patients who present with myo-
cardial infarction), usually need
only maintain their status quo to
receive performance-related
bonus payments.34 Finally, the
percent of a physician’s overall
revenue that is at stake is rarely
more than 10 percent, which
can complicate matters because
any stake less than 10 percent is
seldom worth medical provid-
ers’ time and effort. Again,
though, current “pay for perfor-
mance” models are not intended
to punish physicians, but rather
to change existing payment incentives and encourage rede-
signed systems and large investments in IT (e.g., electronic
medical records). So for physicians and hospitals already
looking for extra capital to make these investments, “pay for
performance” may present a one-time opportunity to have
someone else finance it.
The legal underpinnings of existing “pay for performance”
programs are similar to those of the predominant financial
contracts that determine risks and rewards between medical
providers and medical purchasers (employers and health
plans). The most common programs provide a pure bonus to
those providers that meet performance targets.35 Some “pay
for performance” programs, however, are more aggressive
and withhold—thereby putting at risk—a proportion of con-
tracted payments to medical providers unless they meet per-
formance targets.36 Key to the design and implementation of
any “pay for performance” program is health plans’ contrac-
tual bargaining with medical providers over performance or
quality criteria and bonus structures. The U.S. Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission regulate the
extent to which physicians and hospitals can form networks
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If publishing K-12 educational test
scores and “on-time arrival” statistics
is considered a good idea for
encouraging local schools and
airlines to improve their performance,
the argument goes, how bad of an
idea could it be for medical
providers?
to collectively bargain with health plans without violating
U.S. antitrust laws.37 Yet these regulations, which allow
providers to form networks as long as they represent no
more than approximately a quarter of all the providers in
their relevant geographic market, only provide protection
from federal investigation.38 Private parties and state regula-
tors are free to initiate their own antitrust claims.
The prevalence of “pay for performance” reimbursement is
growing,39 largely as a result of employers’ intense efforts to
limit their health care cost inflation.40 Most of the areas that
it targets are primary care and, thus, are likely to improve
patient outcomes,41 although early experience with “pay for
performance” has been less than impressive in terms of dra-
matically improving health care quality.42 The majority of
measures that “pay for performance” models use to deter-
mine bonus payments target the underuse of care. As a
result, when adopted, they usually increase health spend-
ing.43 “Pay for performance” also appears to be well-suited
for treating patients with chronic conditions, such as diabe-
tes, heart disease, and hypertension.44 As a dominant reim-
bursement model, though, it is still years away.
Yet if Medicare eventually shifts the bulk of its reimburse-
ment to various forms of “pay for performance,” as many of
its current leaders want to do,45 the medical landscape would
change rapidly. Medicare is the “800-pound gorilla” of
American medicine. When it moves, virtually all other
stakeholders in the U.S. health care system are forced to
adjust their behavior to varying degrees.46 Several senior
Medicare officials are particularly enthusiastic about “pay
for performance,” because upwards of 80 percent of the pro-
gram’s beneficiaries have at least 1 chronic condition, and
30 percent have 4 or more. The latter group drives almost 80
percent of Medicare’s total spending.47 Any new reimburse-
ment system that can improve the health of these patients
with multiple chronic conditions creates the potential for
significant cost savings. Medicare is currently experiment-
ing with a number of hospitals that have voluntarily agreed
to participate in a program that rewards top performing hos-
pitals by increasing their payment for Medicare patients.48
Ultimately, the medical community should prepare to play a
very proactive role in determining precisely how “perfor-
mance” and “quality” will be measured and, thus, how this
new form of reimbursement can best improve both patient
safety and health care delivery (not health plans’ financial
well-being). It is an old cliché, but when it comes to “pay for
performance” reimbursement, the “devil will most certainly
be in the details.”
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